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Taking Music Philosophically Guenter Zoeller 
PHILOSPHICAL INTEREST IN MUSIC goes back to the very begin 
nings of Western thought. In the late sixth century B.c., the Greek phi 
losopher and sect founder Pythagoras discovered the mathematical basis of 
musical intervals, thereby assigning the study and practice of music to the 
activity of the intellect, well beyond the confines of the senses. In their 
cosmological speculations Pythagoras and his school extended the concept 
of music to include the music produced by the movements of the celestial 
spheres 
? a music inaudible to the human ear but detectable in philosophi 
cal meditation. It could be argued that Western music never completely 
ridded itself of the Pythagorean spiritualization of this particular art form. 
Even in its institutional and sociological history, music was set apart from 
the other arts through its historical proximity to philosophy. The medie 
val educational system considered music one of the seven "free" or "liberal 
arts" (artes liberales), grouped together, in the quadrivium, with arithmetic, 
geometry and astronomy, and strictly separated from such "mechanical 
arts" as painting and sculpture. 
Throughout the centuries the recognition of music's affinity to philoso 
phy has taken various forms. Quite a number of philosophers, among 
them Augustine and Descartes, wrote musical treatises, others engaged in 
contemporary musical controversies or actually composed music. A few 
philosophers, most notoriously Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Adorno, did all 
three of those things. In the nineteenth century, Arthur Schopenhauer's 
metaphysics of music, with its appreciation of music's unique power to 
express the essence of the world, proved highly influential among com 
posers (Wagner) and the wider public alike. In the twentieth century, 
efforts at taking music seriously from a philosophical perspective have been 
divided between a Continental camp, whose championship of the Schoen 
berg school tends to be partisan, polemic, and even pontificating, and the 
more sober and pedestrian work done by Anglo-American scholars trying 
to 
apply the tools of philosophical analysis to the recalcitrant topics of the 
production and reception of musical works of art. 
Over the past decade the American philosopher Peter Kivy (Rutgers 
University) has published a series of five books in the philosophy of music. 
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On the basis of his double training as an analytic aesthetician and as a his 
torian of aesthetics, Kivy has been pursuing a project that is at once mod 
est and ambitious. It is a modest project in that Kivy has not set out to give 
us a 
systematic aesthetics of music with encyclopedic scope and complete 
ness. Rather, each of Kivy's books takes up a fairly specific, although cen 
tral topic in the philosophy of music, and pursues that topic with an 
intriguing mix of erudition, scrutiny, and casual tone. The project is quite 
ambitious, though, in its goal of bringing philosophical respectability to 
talking about music. There are, to be sure, two well-established discourses 
about music, that of the musicologist and that of the layperson. But musi 
cological knowledge is concerned with the technical dimensions of music 
and does not address itself to the ordinary music listener and lover, while 
the layperson's verbal reaction to music is for the most part methodologi 
cally naive and not the result of actual thinking about music. Kivy pro 
poses to overcome this dilemma between inaccessible expertism and inac 
ceptable dilettantism in musical discourse by instituting a thoughtful, 
methodologically reflective, and yet generally accessible discourse on music 
? a discourse he terms "humanist." Kivy's books are intended to provide 
the foundations for such humanist music criticism. 
Each of Kivy's books on music aesthetics addresses one of four major 
issues in the criticism of music. The topics are music and the emotions, 
discussed in The Corded Shell and its revised and substantially enlarged re 
edition under the title Sound Sentiment; music and representation, in Sound 
and Semblance; music and drama in Osmin's Rage; and instrumental music, 
so-called absolute music, in Music Alone. In dealing with these four issues, 
Kivy relies on numerous musical examples taken from the Western classi 
cal tradition. The writing proceeds in the form of careful philosophical 
reflections, often organized by the progression from an initial thesis 
through its substantiation and defense against contrary views to conclu 
sions drawn under the honest admission of how much work still remains 
to be done. In addition to being logically sound, Kivy's reasoning is also 
historically informed. The views of quite a number of past music theorists 
and philosophers are presented and critically evaluated. 
In Sound Sentiment (and its precursor, The Corded Shell), Kivy examines 
the relation between music and the emotions. He contrasts two major 
views on the expressive powers of music. In the arousal or stimulation 
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model, a specific piece of music causes a specific emotional response in the 
listener. The music itself is devoid of emotional qualities; it merely pro 
vokes an emotional reaction in the listener. Kivy presents evidence for the 
historical significance of the theory, and goes on to critique its inade 
quacies. The arousal theory of musical expression cannot account for the 
pleasure we take in music of the negative emotions. As a purely physio 
logical account of musical perception it is furthermore blind to the pres 
ence of mental activity in music listening. We do not just passively 
undergo sensory stimulation when enjoying a musical performance. 
Rather, we engage, more or less actively, in thought processes. Typically 
these thought processes involve the recognition of the music as sad, or 
triumphant, or whatever may be the case. 
This is where the alternative, representational model of musical expres 
sion comes in. In this view, the emotional features of music are objects of 
cognition. According to the representational model, the expressive fea 
tures of music manifest themselves in the listener through processes of 
recognition. The sadness of the music is recognized as that music's emo 
tional content. Yet even on the representational view, the emotions are 
not literally present in the music. Kivy clarifies the situation with a crucial 
conceptual distinction in the language of musical expression. Things, 
among them works of art such as musical compositions, can be expressive 
of emotions without expressing those very emotions. Calling a piece of 
music sad is a figure of speech for the more literal account that the music 
exhibits properties which resemble a certain emotion. The composition 
itself is not a sentient being; hence it can neither feel nor express sadness. 
Yet the music can convey the thought of sadness to its listeners by 
resembling the emotion of sadness as felt and expressed by human beings. 
Kivy provides two complementary accounts for the resemblance 
between music and the emotions. On the contour model, the music shares 
certain gestural features with the human expression of emotions. The 
most basic case is the imitation of the human voice in singing. But Kivy 
suggests extending the application of the model to more abstract forms of 
isomorphism between musical properties and expressive properties. Kivy 
attributes the recognition of emotional contours to the general psycho 
logical fact that human perception tends to animate its objects by inter 
preting given data in ways that meet the anthropomorphic world view. In 
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the case of music this natural fact takes the form of the spontaneous anima 
tion of sound. The second, supplementary account of the affinity between 
music and emotions is the convention model. Here the recognition of 
emotions in music is mediated through cultural rules that are learned and 
exercised as part of one's membership in a musical culture. Kivy traces the 
convention-governed recognition of emotions to the psychological 
phenomenon of association whereby a previously encountered conjunc 
tion of musical properties and emotional meaning predisposes the mind to 
connect the occurrence of the former with that of the latter. 
Kivy's account of emotional musical content carefully avoids the appeal 
to the composer's intention. Like other practitioners of analytic aesthetics 
Kivy is deeply suspicious of the logical deficiencies in an argument from 
artistic intention ("intentionalist fallacy"). Rather, Kivy locates the basis 
for emotive musical description in the music itself. To that extent, he 
defends the objectivity of emotive discourse about music. It needs to be 
kept in mind, though, that music is the sound as perceived in anthropo 
morphic animation and cultural interpretation. Kivy's objectivism regard 
ing emotionally effective musical properties is thus parasitic upon the lim 
ited objectivity of musical conventions. No claim to universal validity is 
raised. 
In Sound and Semblance Kivy addresses the question whether and how 
music can represent. The discussion of music's representational powers is 
strictly descriptive. No value judgment concerning the aesthetic merits of 
musical representation is attempted. Kivy examines in detail the functions 
that text and title have in providing music with reference to extramusical 
reality. In an attempt to sharpen the concept of resemblance that underlies 
the relation between art work and mundane referent, Kivy distinguishes 
two kinds of artistic representation. They are picturing, in which the 
reference can be grasped without verbal aid, and representation in the nar 
row sense, which requires some verbal guidance for identifying the refer 
ence in question. 
Kivy establishes an intricate typology of musical illustrations by draw 
ing on dozens of examples from Western music. The classification is not 
meant as a 
rigid schema. It is intended as an orientation in dealing with the 
great variety of ways in which music can refer to things outside itself. 
Kivy argues that, in the absence of a semblance of sound between music 
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and referent, a more abstract communality of structure (isomorphism) can 
take the place of the relation of resemblance. However, in those cases 
detecting the reference will take both verbal leads and a certain degree of 
musical sophistication. 
Among the functions of representation in music discussed by Kivy is the 
use of musical illustration for expressive purposes. Kivy shows through 
examples how representational music can be expressive of emotions: either 
by arousing the emotions that would be felt in the presence of the object 
musically depicted, or by having the music itself be expressive of certain 
emotions. Kivy's point that music of a certain kind can arouse certain 
emotions in the listener might seem at odds with his earlier rejection of the 
arousal theory of musical expression. It must be kept in mind, though, 
that Kivy nowhere disputes the fact that some music causes an emotional 
reaction. What he disputes is the claim that the arousal theory can suffi 
ciently explain the emotional dimension of musical experience. 
A major challenge to musical representationalism is musical purism, or 
the view that representational features of music are either irrelevant or of 
little importance in the understanding of music. Kivy meets the challenge 
by showing that, historically speaking, music has been successful at repre 
senting through sound and structure what is otherwise referred to by 
words. This is not to deny that some music may not represent at all. In 
fact, one of Kivy's other books, Music Alone, addresses exactly that issue. 
For now, Kivy merely defends the very possibility of music representing 
some extramusical thought ?and he does so by pointing to the indis 
putable fact that music can illustrate thoughts by semblance of sound or 
some structural identity between music and thought. 
With the possibility of musical representation established and the prin 
cipal ways of achieving musical representation enumerated, Kivy examines 
how the representational dimension of music should inform the listener's 
interpretation of music. Kivy concedes a crucial role to the composer's 
manifest intention, while at the same time reminding his readers that reli 
ably documented intentions are scarce. Moreover, intention is merely a 
necessary condition for interpreting music representationally. The lack of 
known intentions rules out representational interpretation, but intention 
alone will not do. Intention needs to be supported by evidence from the 
musical text itself. Thus the success of both the expressive and the repre 
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sentational interpretation of music is seen as a function of one's musical 
sophistication. Responsible music criticism may not require excessive 
technical knowledge, but it certainly demands a high familiarity with the 
cultural background and artistic conventions of the music. 
Osmin's Rage is a study in the aesthetics of a particular musical genre, 
opera. Kivy does not attempt a comprehensive philosophy of opera. His 
examinations of the relations between text, drama and music are limited 
to three historical forms of operatic music, each associated with a particu 
lar composer: the Florentine reform opera represented through Monte 
verdi, the baroque opera seria in Handel's works, and Mozart's contribu 
tions to eighteenth-century opera buffa. Kivy proposes to study all three 
types of opera as so many approximations to the aesthetic ideal of "drama 
made-music." In this view, the purpose of opera is the representation of 
the emotional content of the libretto in the medium of music. The music 
acoustically illustrates the thoughts and emotions contained in the text. 
This way of viewing opera is contrasted with the competing aesthetic ideal 
of 
"opera as drama." In the latter view, music accompanies the text as one 
of the several artistic media involved in the rendition of the drama. It must 
be stressed that the distinction is not meant to classify individual operas or 
kinds of operas. Its primary purpose is to organize the critical discourse on 
operatic music by providing a standard for assessing the artistic merits of 
given operas. 
In electing the approach of drama-made-music, Kivy has chosen an aes 
thetic that values music which in its very structure mirrors ("represents") 
the emotional meaning of the text. Kivy argues that the construal of emo 
tions in a given operatic text is just as culturally determined and histori 
cally shifting as their representation in musical form. More specifically, 
Kivy holds that the texts of each of the operas considered are informed by 
the philosophical account of the emotions reigning at the time, and that 
the musical representation of the text aims at the perfect musical equiva 
lent of the emotions so understood. For Monteverdi, the philosophical 
background is the humanist revival of Plato's psychology and the Platonic 
Aristotelian understanding of art as imitation. In the case of Handel, the 
underlying philosophy is Descartes's account of the "passions of the soul." 
Mozart, finally, is connected with the associationist theory of the emo 
tions prevalent in the eighteenth century. Kivy does not claim that the 
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composers, or even their librettists, had any familiarity with the philoso 
phies in question. The correlations between text, music and philosophy 
are attributed to a common cultural-historical climate. 
The intriguing feature of this somewhat speculative account of music 
history lies in some of the details of the proposed correlation. That monody 
and the recitativo treatment of the human voice in Monteverdi are attempts 
to 
musically represent emotionally inflected human speech may not be a 
new insight. But to suggest, as Kivy does, that the ABA-form of the da 
capo aria in opera seria represents the discrete, abruptly changing and pecu 
liarly obsessive character of Cartesian emotions is an ingenious reading. 
Similarly innovative seems the attempt to understand the fluidity of the 
emotions ?their indefinite and varying character?in Mozart's opere buffe. 
In this view, the emotions permeate the whole of mental life by accom 
panying the mind's various activities with affective responses. Kivy views 
that conception of the emotions best represented in the dramatic develop 
ments of Mozart's ensemble and finale scenes. 
In his interpretations of Monteverdi, Handel, and Mozart, Kivy attrib 
utes philosophical dignity and cultural significance to what might other 
wise seem merely internal musical conventions. Kivy thus consolidates the 
general point made in his treatments of musical expressiveness and musical 
representation. The understanding of music is shown to require familiar 
ity with the broader cultural circumstances of a composition. More specifi 
cally, it calls for the ability to have such background knowledge inform 
one's perception of the work in question by entertaining affinities and cor 
relations between extramusical culture and compositional facts. 
While Kivy's earlier publications examine the relation between music 
and various extramusical factors, Music Alone is devoted to "music unac 
companied by text, title, subject, program, or plot." This ideal of musical 
purity is realized in certain kinds of instrumental music that seem to be 
devoid of any reference to things outside the music itself. Kivy thus takes 
up the nineteenth-century musical controversy between the neo-German 
program music of Liszt and Wagner and the conservative adherents of 
"absolute music," centered around Brahms. 
The philosophical problem underlying musical purism can be formu 
lated as the dilemma between the two competing models of musical exper 
ience introduced in Kivy's earlier works. While the stimulation model is 
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able to accommodate the insight that certain music is without content, it 
reduces musical perception to a mindless reception of sensory stimuli. In 
the alternative, cognitive model, the insight into the distinctively intellec 
tual nature of musical perception is preserved, but at the price of having 
music possess a content that compromises its purity. Kivy proposes to cir 
cumvent the two horns of the dilemma. He construes the experience of 
pure music to have a structure sui generis. Pure music is not a representa 
tional object that refers the listener to some extramusical reality. Rather, 
it is an object in its own right, to be perceived by an experience in which 
cognition and enjoyment enhance each other. 
Kivy discusses various ways in which pure music can be experienced, 
ranging from the naive listener's reaction to the most sophisticated techni 
cal appreciation. Kivy himself sides with neither of the two extremes. He 
considers the former approach inadequate to the complexities of the 
music, while the latter is seen as suppressing the experiential side of music 
listening. Kivy advocates an "emotive formalism" that combines the 
understanding of musical structures with the recognition of non-techni 
cal, emotive properties of pure music. He rejects the two standard accounts 
of the role of emotions in pure music. Pure music is neither simply the 
cause of certain emotions in the listener, nor is it "about" emotions in the 
sense of telling us something about the world as a place governed by emo 
tions. For Kivy, emotions are present in pure music along with other 
qualities of the music that organize the musical structure. This view sets 
Kivy apart from extreme music formalists who deny the legitimacy of 
describing pure music in emotive terms. 
The vindication of the language of emotions for formal musical criti 
cism is certainly Kivy's main accomplishment in his study of pure music. It 
is the final step in the comprehensive project of laying the foundation for a 
generally intelligible, yet intellectually responsible ("humanist") musical 
criticism. For Kivy, the comprehension of pure music includes the appre 
hension of its emotional qualities. The perception of emotions in music is 
not seen as a way of going beyond the purely musical, but as constituting 
an integral part of the essentially formal experience of music alone. But 
does the enjoyment-enhancing perception of structure exhaust the experi 
ence of pure music? Kivy himself acknowledges the fact that pure music, 
while definitely not being about anything in particular, can yet be experi 
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enced as significant or "profound." To a more speculative mind this 
experience might suggest the view that pure music, in its best exemplars, 
is not about anything in the world but rather about the world as a whole? 
that it is, in Heidegger's term, world-disclosing, rather than discovering 
anything particular in and about the world. But Kivy's analytic scruples 
and methodological cautions leave no room for such conjecture. He would 
rather not give any explanation at all ?thereby inviting our own. 
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